![]() ![]() ![]() Thus, engaging with armed groups runs the risks of recognition and legitimization of armed groups and may lead to more demands. It points out an interesting line of thought that states engage with states and not non-states. In advancing the argument of failures in military integration as a conflict resolution strategy, the paper glances back at the Montevideo convention on the roles and obligations of states. All these are factors that are likely to lead to breakdown of a peace agreement and eventual resumption of conflict with formation of splin-ter factions of the integrated rebels, as is the case with National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) elements in DRC who mutinied and formed M23 movement. The battle animosities and suspicion tend to persist even after the integration. Furthermore, the pap er notes that integration leads to disaffection among the rank and file of the national military since some of the rebel elements become their seniors without proper qualifications. The paper argues that while such an approach is good for peace’s sake, it usually fails to attain peace in the long term due to its rushed conceptualization and implementation, lack of sufficient resource support, lack of political will, vested interests by the armed groups and external actor, among other reasons. It takes an overview of such approaches in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). This paper examines the integration of armed groups into security sector of a country, especially the military, as an approach to peace building. ![]()
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